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DISCUSSION 
DARWIN AND WHEWELL 
PAUL R. THAGARD 
IN a recent article, Michael Ruse describes some important respects in which 
Charles Darwin’s work was influenced by William Whewell.’ However, the 
influence of Whewell on Darwin was even greater than Ruse suggests. I shall 
show this by presenting new evidence that Darwin had read Whewell’s 
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences and then arguing that Darwin was strongly 
influenced by Whewell’s views on consilience of inductions and true causes. 
No direct evidence has been found that Darwin owned or read Whewell’s 
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. This is surprising, since Darwin admired 
Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences, and after reading J. F. W. 
Herschel’s review of the History and Philosophy he wrote in a notebook: ‘I must 
study Whewell on Philosophy of Science.” But indirect evidence that Darwin 
read Whewell’s Philosophy is to be found in Darwin’s The Variation of 
Animals and Plants Under Domestication, published in 1868. Late in the book, 
Darwin introduces his controversial theory of pangenesis. He puts it forward as 
a provisional hypothesis, one that brings together a multitude of facts and may 
thus be serviceable until a better hypothesis is advanced. Darwin defends this 
procedure by quoting Whewell: ‘As Whewell, the historian of the inductive 
sciences remarks: - “Hypotheses may often be of service to science, when they 
involve a certain portion of incompleteness, and even of error.“‘3 Except for the 
spelling of ‘errour’, the capitalization of ‘hypotheses’, and the absence of 
italics, this is the exact wording of the maxim as stated by Whewell in the second 
volume of The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences.4 
Of course, Darwin may have quoted the maxim from some source other than 
Whewell’s Philosophy. One possible source is Whewell’s own History, but 
although that work contains the ideas expressed in the maxim,5 I have not 
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found in it a statement of the maxim as such. Whewell’s characterization of the 
division between the History and the Philosophy implies that the statement of 
such maxims be reserved for the latter work.6 Another likely source for Darwin 
of Whewell’s maxim is Herschel’s review of Whewell’s books. Herschel 
commends Whewell for emphasizing the value of imcomplete hypotheses, but 
he does not actually quote the maxim .’ Hence the most probable source of 
Darwin’s quotation from Whewell is the original one: Whewell’s Philosophy. 
That Darwin quoted Whewell in 1868 would be of interest even if it did not 
show that he had read Whewell’s Philosophy. Darwin’s references to 
methodologists were infrequent, and it is significant that he would refer to 
Whewell long after he knew him personally and read his History. 
The conclusion that Darwin read Whewell’s Philosophy is reinforced by 
noticing Darwin’s use of Whewell’s important notion of the consilience of 
inductions. Whewell says that ‘the evidence in favour of our induction is of a 
much higher and more forcible character when it enables us to explain and 
determine cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated in the 
formation of our hypothesis.‘8 According to Whewell, ‘the cases in which 
inductions from classes of facts altogether different have thus jumped together 
belong to the best established theories which the history of science contains.‘g A 
theory achieves a consilience of inductions by explaining a number of different 
classes of facts, some of which were not contemplated in the formation of the 
hypothesis. I shall now present two striking passages where Darwin, without 
using the term ‘consilience of inductions’, recommends consilience as the 
criterion for judging his theory of evolution. 
The first is from the same source as Darwin’s quotation from Whewell - 
The Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication. Darwin states: 
In scientific investigation it is permitted to invent any hypothesis, and if it explains 
various large and independent classes of facts it rises to the rank of a well-grounded 
theory. The undulations of the ether and even its existence are hypothetical, yet 
every one now admits the undulatory theory of light. The principle of natural 
selection may be looked at as a mere hypothesis, but rendered in some degree 
probable by what we positively know of the variability of organic beings in a state 
of nature, - by what we positively know of the struggle for existence, and the 
consequent almost inevitable preservation of favourable variation, - and from the 
analogical formation of domestic races. Now this hypothesis may be tested, - and 
this seems to me to be the only fair and legitimate manner of considering the whole 
question, - by trying whether it explains several large and independent classes of 
facts; such as the geological succession of organic beings, their distribution in past 
and present times, and their mutual affinities and homologies. If the principle of 
natural selection does explain these and other large bodies of facts, it ought to be 
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received. On the ordinary view of each species having been independently created, 
we gain no scientific explanation of any of these facts.‘O 
This passage concisely summarizes Darwin’s long argument in The Origin of 
Species. Darwin believes that his theory deserves to be accepted because it 
explains several large and independent classes of facts. In short, it achieves a 
consilence of inductions. 
To the second edition of the Origin Darwin added the sentence: ‘I cannot 
believe that a false theory would explain, as it seems to me that the theory of 
evolution does explain, the several large classes of facts above specified.“’ In 
the sixth edition of 1878, Darwin replaced this with the following passage which 
shows definite awareness that he was using an established pattern of argument: 
It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a 
manner as does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts 
above specified. It has recently been objected that this is an unsafe method of 
arguing; but it is a method used in judging of the common events of life, and has often 
been used by the greatest natural philosophers. The undulatory theory of light has 
thus been arrived at; and the belief in the revolution of the earth on its own axis was 
until lately supported by hardly any direct evidence.12. 
Again, Darwin emphasizes the explanation of different classes of facts, the 
achievement of a consilience of inductions. It is also noteworthy that the 
undulatory theory of light, mentioned in both of the long passages quoted 
above, was one of Whewell’s favourite examples of the consilience of 
inductions. 
Another methodological issue on which Darwin followed Whewell was the 
controversial issue of true causes, verae causae. I believe that Ruse is mistaken 
in attributing to Darwin a position on true causes akin to that of J. F. W. 
Herschel.13 Ruse claims that Darwin’s major motive for stressing the analogy 
between artificial and natural selection was that the analogy enabled him to 
show, by Herschel’s standards, that natural selection is a true cause. As Ruse 
points out, Herschel maintained that hypotheses must employ only true causes, 
but allowed that a cause could be judged to be true if it were analogous to causes 
directly perceived.14 
However, Whewell rejected Herschel’s emphasis on analogy, arguing that 
analogy cannot serve as a guide to true causes, since the restriction of causes to 
those of such kinds as we know to exist is no restriction at a11.15 It admits for 
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example the Cartesian hypothesis of vortices, since we are familiar with whirling 
fluids carrying bodies around in orbit. Whewell concluded that a cause is true if 
it leads to a consilience of inductions: 
We may, provisorily, assume such hypothetical causes as will account for any given 
class of natural phenomena; but that when two different classes of facts lead us to 
the same hypothesis, we may hold it to be a true cause.16 
Darwin shared this anti-Newton, anti-Herschel position on true causes. In 1860, 
he wrote to J. D. Hooker, following a lecture given by T. H. Huxley to the 
Royal Institution: ‘I must confess that as an exposition of the doctrine the 
lecture seems to me an entire failure.“’ Darwin’s main complaint against 
Huxley is: 
He gave no just idea of Natural Selection. I have always looked at the doctrine of 
Natural Selection as an Hypothesis, which, if it explained several large classes of 
facts, would deserve to be ranked as a theory deserving acceptance.18 
Darwin remarks that the difference between him and Huxley is ‘that he rates 
higher than I do the necessity of Natural Selection being shown to be a vera 
causa always in action.“g In accord with the doctrine of Whewell, Darwin had 
no special concern about whether his hypothesis involved a true cause; all that 
mattered is that it explained several classes of facts and thus achieved a 
consilience of inductions. Hence Darwin did not need the analogy between 
natural and artificial selection to show that natural selection is a true cause. The 
analogy was important to him for other reasons, such as its heuristic value and 
its contribution, independent of the issue of true causes, to the acceptability of 
the theory of evolution by means of natural selection.20 
A strong case thus exists to support my contention that Darwin read 
Whewell’s Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. Certainly, Darwin’s 
methodology was similar to Whewell’s on two very important matters, 
consilience of inductions and true causes. Darwin’s debt to Whewell was 
therefore considerable.2’ 
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